The receiver for a dissolved Delaware corporation (D'Angelo) brought an action against a decentralized agency of the Mexican government (Pemex) for an accounting of the corporation's royalty and participating interests in oil expropriated by the Mexican government. Pemex moved for summary judgment.
In 1938, Mexico expropriated the "personal and real properties" of seventeen foreign oil companies. Subsequently, the Mexican President issued a decree delegating to Pemex the responsibility for determining those parties entitled to compensation. Following a request by Pemex, the Mexican attorney-general rendered an official opinion that the decree of expropriation extinguished all of the rights of the royalty holders.
Although the receiver admitted the validity of the decree of expropriation, he contended the decree did not encompass the corporation's interests since it only owned royalty and participating interests attributable to the oil concessions. The receiver further claimed that the Act of State doctrine did not foreclose examination of a claim against a purely commercial enterprise such as Pemex. Finally, the receiver contended that, even if the corporation's interests were in fact extinguished by the decree of expropriation, Pemex was obligated by Mexican law to compensate the corporation for the value of its interests. Pemex claimed that the failure to recognize and pay most of the plaintiffs claims was an act of state of the Mexican government which precluded the U.S. court from looking into the validity of the claims. An opinion of the attorney general of Mexico was introduced to support the validity of the President of Mexico's actions in authorizing Pemex to settle claims for compensation.
The court, citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) , accepted the opinion of the attorney general of Mexico as an official decla.
ration by the Mexican government that the expropriation decree extinguished the corporation's royalty and participating rights. As such, the decree constituted an act of state precluding further inquiry into its scope and effect. Observing that Pemex was not in existence when the expropriation occurred, the court held that the fact that the Mexican government ultimately entered the oil business through Pemex did not make the expropriation itself a commercial activity. The court also considered the Mexican attorney general's opinion as controlling on the failure to compensate the corporation. The actions of Permex in denying compensation were sovereign governmental acts entitled to Act of State protection. The court pointed out that conduct not evidenced by a formal decree did not lose its character as an act of state if there was sufficient evidence in the record of such an act. See Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U'S. 682 (1976) . Consequently, the court granted Pemex's motion for summary judgment.
Walter A. Record ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION Frank B. Hall & Co. v. S.S. Sealreeze Atlantic, 423 F.Supp. 1205 (S.D. N.Y. 1976 ).
This case involved an action brought by plaintiff Hall, an insurance broker, against the defendants, owners of the ship Seafreeze Atlantic, to recover amounts advanced by Hall on their behalf to procure insurance for the ship "until time of sailing."
The Seafreeze Atlantic was a ship built under an experimental pro. gram in 1969. After two years it was found to be commercially inoperable, and was therefore docked and decommissioned in April of 1971. At no time after that date did the ship leave the dock, at least for any commercial voyages. In April of 1974 the defendants purchased the Seafreeze Atlantic, in hopes of restoring her to commercial operation, and retained Hall as an insurance broker to effect a policy of insurance upon its hull and machinery. In February of 1975, after the defendants failed to make their premium payments, Hall personally advanced the amount due to avoid cancellation of the policy. The defendants denied any obligation to repay, and Hall brought suit in the Federal Court, alleging admiralty jurisdiction, to recover the amounts advanced.
The district court never reached the merits of Hall's contentions, hut rather granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court's decision that admiralty jurisdiction was lacking was based upon two grounds. First, the court followed the observation advanced by Professor Moore that insurance policies on "mothballed" vessels (those withdrawn from navigation for an indefinite period of time) and the premium on those policies, fall beyond the jurisdiction of admiralty. 7 A Moore's Federal Practice § 255(l), at 3024, (2d ed. 1976 ). This observation is in accord with the general rule that admiralty is limited to vessels actually in navigation, or only temporarily withdrawn from the state of commercial grace. In determining that the Seafreeze Atlantic was "mothballed," and therefore the insurance premiums related to policies on it were beyond the jurisdiction of admiralty, the court relied heavily upon the fact that the ship had been lying idle for over four years, and that there was no prospect at the time of the vessel's return to commerce or navigation.
Second, the court agreed with Judge Wallace, dissenting in Stanley T. Scott & Co. v. Makah Development Corp., 490 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1974) , that the implied-in-law contractual rights to reimbursement for premiums advanced to maintain marine insurance policies were not maritime in nature and therefore do not give rise to admiralty jurisdiction. Courts have consistently held that a contract to procure marine insurance is not within admiralty jurisdiction, and that to grant admiralty jurisdiction in cases such as this would needlessly expand federal jurisdiction.
This case can be viewed as a reluctancy to expand admiralty jurisdiction. If granted, admiralty jurisdiction has important practical consequences to the litigants: the federal courts have jurisdiction; there is no trial by jury; and special remedies exist for attachment of the defendants' assets prior to judgment.
John Hogan

ARBITRATION
Fuller Co. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 421 F.Supp. 938 (W.D. Pa. 1976 ).
Fuller Company, a Pennsylvania corporation, entered into a contract with Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee (CBG), a Delaware corporation, to sell equipment to be used in a CBG bauxite plant in the Republic of Guinea. A subsequent meeting on January 28, 1975 led to a dispute between the parties. Fuller alleged that the meeting was called to settle all outstanding differences. CBG alleged that it only concerned differences over the drafts of provisional acceptance certificates which Fuller had refused to sign.
CBG submitted a request for arbitration to the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce pursuant to an arbitration clause in its contract with Fuller, seeking indemnification for costs related to alleged defects in equipment bought from Fuller. Fuller then filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, seeking determination of the binding effect of the January "settlement." CBG removed the case to the U.S. District Court, Western District of Pennsylvania.
The original agreement contained an arbitration clause which pro. vided that the parties would go to arbitration according to the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce "should any dispute arise from interpretation or performance of the con.
tract."
The first issue hefore the court was whether CBG could properly invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court pursuant to the terms of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. § §201-9. Before a federal court can invoke jurisdiction pursuant to the terms of the Convention, certain conditions must be met. Contracts between citizens of the United States must either involve property located abroad, envisage performance or enforcement abroad, or have some other reasonable relations with one or more foreign states. The court found that the contract envisaged that Fuller personnel would provide extensive overseas services, and therefore sustained jurisdiction under the Convention.
The second issue before the court was whether the court should order arbitration to be convened pursuant to the terms of the Convention. This issue involved a determination of the scope of the arbitration provision. The court stated, after determining that Pennsylvania law should apply to the contract, that there is a strong judicial presumption in favor of arbitration. In order for an arbitration agreement to terminate under Pennsylvania law, the parties must enter into a new contract. The court then stated that when a settlement agreement was only one of four possible inferences arising from the conduct of the parties at the January meeting, the arbitration clause should be upheld. The court ordered that arbitration be convened and the trial stayed pending issuance of a final award in the arbitration. Barry 1. Harkaway States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) .
NATIONAL STOLEN PROPERTY ACT
United
Five American defendants were convicted in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Texas of conspiracy to violate and violation of the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA). The convictions arose out of transactions involving certain pre-Columbian artifacts allegedly exported from Mexico in contravention of that country's law. The issue on appeal was whether the artifacts were in fact "stolen" within the meaning of the National Stolen Property Act.
The defendants on appeal contended that the artifacts could not be considered "stolen" within the interpretation of the NSPA. In support of this position, appellants argued that the term "stolen" covers only acts which result in the wrongful deprivation of rights of ownership. Since there was insufficient evidence to support the claim of ownership by the Republic of Mexico, the illegal exportation of the artifacts could not be considered a theft within the meaning of the Act.
The Court extensively discussed the development of the laws of Mexico concerning the preservation and regulation of pre-Columbian artifacts. Although Mexico had sought to regulate private ownership of antiquities since 1897, the Court found that it was not until the Federal Law on Archaeological, Artistic and Historic Monuments and Zones of May 6, 1972 that a declaration of ownership had been made 'by the Mexican Government which covered all archaeological objects within its jurisdiction.
The Court felt that in order to determine whether any of the pre. Columbian artifacts were "stolen" it was vital to ascertain the exact date that the artifacts were exported from Mexico. The Court reasoned that if the exportation took place after the effective date of the 1972 law, the artifacts were owned by the Mexican Government and, therefore, illegal exportation would subject the receiver of the articles to the strictures of the National Stolen Property Act. If, however, it could be shown that the exportation occurred before the 1972 Act, then the jury should have been instructed to apply only the appropriate Mexican law.
The U.S. Government argued that notwithstanding the error in instructing the jury as to the exact date of the declaration of ownership by the Mexican Government, the evidence was clear that the artifacts were in the United States after the effective date of the 1972 law. This fact, it was argued, compelled the inference of recent exportation and hence justified the application of the National Stolen Property Act. The court rejected this argument on the ground that "the jury is the only body that could properly make the inference of recent exportation and a holding by us to the contrary would, by supplanting our determination for the jury's verdict, deprive the defendants of their right to a jury trial." [citing United States v. Casale Car Leasing, Inc., 385 F.2d 707, 712 (2d Cir. 1967) ].
The case was reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Maria Lorts
SEARCH OF VESSEL OUTSIDE TERRITORIAL WATERS
United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976).
The Government appealed the district court's orders granting defendants' motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search of their vessel and the entry of a judgment of non-forfeiture. Defendants, on the O/S National, a foreign vessel, were arrested after customs officials boarded and searched their boat, finding marijuana in the hold. Defend. ants were charged with violation of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 which provides that is is unlawful for any person to bring or possess a controlled substance on board any vessel arriving in or departing from the United States or its customs territory.
The facts show that a deputy sheriff became suspicious when he noticed marijuana debris in and near a truck at the end of the pier. Of the five vessels which had departed from the harbor that morning, the less well known vessel was the O/S National. Pursuant to the deputy's request for apprehension of the vessel, Coast Guard and Customs officials boarded and conducted a search of the outbound O/S National in customs waters nine miles from the coast. Defendants were arrested and the O/S National seized, after marijuana was found on board.
The district court determined that the search could not be sustained as a customs search pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a). The court found that there was insufficient probable cause to support a warrantless search, and insufficient evidence to sustain the action as a border search. The Court of Appeals upheld the finding of no probable cause since there was no connection established between the vessel and the site of the marijuana transfer. However, the appellate court held the search proper as a "border search," announcing that a "search in customs waters is a functional border search when the vessel has crossed from territorial waters of the United States and there is . . . a reasonable certainty that any contraband which might be found at the time of the search was also aboard at the border crossing." Id. at 667. The court reversed the orders granting the motion to suppress and the judgment of non-forfeiture, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
In light of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the holding in Stanley establishes an extension of the border search exception to the requirement of probable cause. Since a border was clearly crossed, the border search may take place not only at the border itself (three mile water limit), but at its functional equivalent as well. However, in Stanley, the border crossing was in the context of leaving territorial waters of the United States.
The result in Stanley is significant since the constitutionality of the search is premised on the border search exception in the context of an outgoing border crossing. The decision is grounded upon the Congressional intent of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 to protect Americans from the gorwing problem of drug abuse through the regulation of exportation by Customs officials in order to control drug trafficking. Further justification for the court's holding is found by purporting to compare the purposes for the two types of border crossings, incoming and outgoing. In assence, however, the court merely states the traditional reasons for justifying an incoming border search and summarily concludes that the reasons are sufficiently similar to justify the constitutionality of the search of an outgoing vessel. The pressures of official expediency and the context of the outgoing border crossing search simply do not present circumstances sufficiently compelling to justify a new exception being carved out of the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff brought suit to contest the assessment of Florida use and sales taxes pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. The accrued taxes, assessed at $6,848.95, were levied on personal property which petitioner maintained was an export and thus exempted from state taxation by the Import-Export clause of the U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
Petitioner was a subcontractor for a construction project in the Bahamas. He supplied, fabricated or installed air conditioning and plumbing equipment for the contractor. The disputed tax arose from equipment ordered from both within and outside the state, which was delivered to either the petitioner or the contractor in care of Transworld Marine in Miami. The equipment was stored in Miami and later loaded onto barges chartered by the contractor for shipment to the Bahamas. No ocean bills of lading or export declarations with regard to this equipment were before the Court. The barges transporting the equipment were not instrumentalities of a common carrier.
There being no material issue of fact, the trial judge below entered a summary judgment against petitioner sustaining the application of the tax. The only question for consideration on appeal was whether the equipment was an "export" for the purposes of the Import-Export Clause of the Constitution. The Court cited Chapter 212.06(5), Florida Statutes, which provides three tests for determining export status. The statute requires that the property be delivered to a common carrier for shipment outside the state or to a licensed exporter for exporting or mailed by United States mail outside of the state. Petitioner did not assert that any of these tests were satisfied. Therefore, be failed to rebut the statutory presumption that tangible personal property is not an "export."
Furthermore, the Court found that the instant case was controlled by Kosydan v. National Cash Register, 417 U.S. 62 (1974) . In that case the Supreme Court upheld the imposition, by Ohio, of a state ad valorem tax on machines bound for foreign markets but stored in Ohio. The machines were completely unsuitable for domestic use, thus there was no danger of them being diverted into the American market. Nevertheless, the Court found that the entry into the stream of exportation had not been affected and therefore the state tax was invalid.
The result of Kosydan was the rather mechanistic rule that property has to be virtually in possession of a common carrier before Constitu-tional protection arises. Petitioner's case failed to meet this standard in light of the uncontested fact that the barges used to transport the equipment were not under the control of a common carrier. The summary judgment in favor of the State of Florida was affirmed.
John Mauro
